Research

Book Project

The Political Logic of Subnational Public Goods Provision: Evidence from Indonesia

Abstract: My book project attempts to explain the variations in the patterns of subnational provision of public goods in developing countries. I argue that there is an interactive effect between ethnic geography and economic geography that inform the political elites of (1) what type of public goods to be allocated to maximize political returns to investment and (2) which subnational units to allocate to maximize economic returns to investment. I argue that all else equal, politicians will allocate targetable goods (e.g., latrines) to the core voters if ethnic geography is highly segregated and will target non-excludable goods (e.g. schools) if the ethnic geography is more dispersed with greater cross-cuttingness of ethnic groups. As for the role of economic geography, all else equal, politicians will target the areas that will bring greater returns not in terms of the growth rate (in which case poorer regions would be targeted instead) but more economically productive areas to increase efficiency and productivity of the region. I test the theory using a cross-national sample of countries and a case study of Indonesia.

Publications

Oh, Soomin and Hudson, David. 2024. "Why doesn’t everyone get the same?" Chapter 11 in Mcloughlin, C., Ali, S., Xie, K., Cheeseman, N., and Hudson, D. (eds.). The Politics of Development: Institutions, Incentives, and Ideas, London, Sage.  

Working Papers

Distributive Politics


Public Opinion on Poverty & Development


Historical Legacies on Development